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"Groundwater and Intergovernmental Relations in the 
Southern San Joaquin Valley, California"
I.	 Introduction: Groundwater ("GW") Management in the 
Southern San Joaquin Valley ("SSJV") 
A. Purpose of Presentation: To Dispel Myths 
Our goal is not to advocate general or specific GW
management outcomes, but to explore institutional
complexities of the SSJV which we believe have been
inadequately analyzed in public policy debates thus
far. We will therefore focus on three simplifying
and inaccurate myths.
Myth #1: Groundwater is not managed in the S&P/.
Myth #2: The federal and state governments play
a minor role in GW use in the SSJV.
Myth #3: There is no question that GW use
should be more heavily regulated in the SSJV.
B. Location and General Physiographic Features of the 
SSJV (Tulare Basin); 4 General Subregions 
Despite the conventional wisdom regarding North vs.
South alignments in California water politics, the
southern half of this agriculturally-oriented valley
is split into policy-significant subparts. Key
differentiating factors include surface water availa-
bility and price; GW availability, rechargeability
and depth; and land ownership and land use patterns.
C. Significance of the SSJV as a Case Study in GW Use 
We plunge into this complex geographical region
because water in the SSJV constitutes a major
resource sustaining a highly productive agricultural
economy, and is a major chal:Mnge for state laad and
water policymakers.
	
1.	 The SSJV is a significant state, national and
international center of agricultural
productivity.
a. 3.3 million acres of irrigated far;;Iiall::
produce diverse specialty and staple crops.
b. All four SSJV counties rank in California's
top ten in agricultural production. Three
counties (Fresno, Kern and Tulare) rank in
the nation's top five; Fresno County as a
separate country would rank 12th or 13th in
world.
c. The SSJV is the major reason why California
leads the U.S. in production of 40 crops:
the State's top industry generated
$14 billion in 1982 (about three times that
amount if industries related to agriculture
are included).
2. SSJV agriculture is a major water consumer in
California and a major source of imbalance in
the State's water system.
a. Agriculture (statewide) accounts for 85-90%
of all water consumed in California.
b. The SSJV accounts for about 30% of all
water consumed in California, and generates
only 9% (7 maf) of the State's supply.
c. The SSJV accounts for about 1.1 maf, or
approximately 50%, of the State's 2.2 maf
total annual overdraft.
d. GW use in the SSJV varies in close
relationship with surface water
availability (compare 1975: SSJV water use
was 46% surface water, 54% GW; with 1977 
(drought year) when water use was 16%
surface water, 84% GW).
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D. Four Major Conclusions from Our Study 
1. Depending upon one's priorities, GW may not lc
optimally managed in the SSJV, but it is not
unregulated. GW is widely recognized among
local districts as an integral part of the
Valley's water programs.
2. All three levels of government, and many private
parties (including but by no means limited to
agricultural interests), play a role in the
Valley's water management picture.
3. GW management in the SSJV results from the
cumulative efforts of local institutions to
respond to diverse natural factors, historical
situations, land-use and economic conditions,
and state and federal water programs.
4. While justification for more direct or
comprehensive conservation/management efforts
may exist, any call for or design of new
initiatives must proceed in light of the present
situation: (1) many governmental entities
directly and consciously influence GW use in the
SSJV and sometimes directly manage it; (2)
nearly all of those entities have significant,
presently unexercised authority to manage GW
further.
E. Two Basic Observations Underlie Our Conclusions
1.	 Despite the fact that surface water is highly
regulated in California while GW apparently is
not, the two water sources are inseparable
hydrologically, politically, economically and in
an overall management perspective. (We emphasize
this point because in California the debate over
Valley GW minimizes or ignores the
interconnections.)
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a. California's extensive surface water
transport and delivery systems were
initiated in large part to solve OW
overdraft problems.
b. GW use is closely controlled by surface
water availability, price and other manage-
ment factors; thus, surface water delivery
organizations are unavoidably in the GW
business.
2.	 The local management institutions in the SSJV
are numerous and diverse; with varying degrees
of sophistication and premeditation they are
engaged in efforts to reduce GW pumping,
recharge aquifers, and stretch available
supplies as widely as possible, particularly on
a short-term basis.
a. Interdistrict relations are characterized
by a complex and dynamic mixture of heated
competition and opportunistic cooperation
to secure the best "hater deals" possible
for individual district members.
b. The local districts' first loyalty is to
their members. They cooperat2 onLy when it
is in their mutual best interests to do so.
F. Format of Presentation: Three Parts 
i.	 General introduction to the local, state and
federal water institutions affecting GW in the
SSJV (BTA).
2. Brief case study of unusual experience of Fresno
Irrigation District (FID) which illustrates the
numerous variables influencing GW management in
the SSJV (SKF).
3. A brief discussion of the factors which are
likely to affect future institutional
arrangements in the area (BTA).
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II. Basic Institutions Affecting GW in the SSJV 
A. Major Requlatorv Institutions 
1.	 Surface Water Allocation.
Both riparian and appropriative rights are
honored in California. The latter are
administered through the permit system of the
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB); the
former are governed by common law. In the SSJV,
however, water project contracts are the
dominant form of water entitlement. Th.-2y are
administered by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
for federal water projects, and by the
California Department of Water Resourc:::: (DWR)
for the State Water Project (SWP). Surface
water allocation in the SSJV is thus determined
by a combination of SWRCB permit requirements,
common law riparian rights, and, predominantly,
state and federal water project pricing and
distribution policies.
a. Riparian rights in California have priority
over appropriative rights. All rights are
limited by the criterion of "reasonable
beneficial use" under Article X, 3 2 of the
California Constitution.
b. An appropriative permit system has been
operative since 1914. The trend has been a
steady increase in the requiremen:
governing the granting of permits, and in
the regulation of allocations under
permits. Early on, review was confined to
the availability of water for appropria-
tion, the existence of a beneficial use,
and a limited public interest test. Modern
permits include extensive terms and
conditions, reservation of administrative
jurisdiction for reconsideration of per-
mits, and, most recently, a "public trust"
criterion. The latter development suonet;t3
that the prior appropriation doctrine in
California may be evolving away from a firm
notion of property rights, toward one of
permits as "usufructuary licenses," subject
to possible revocation if the SWRCB or the
courts later determine that the "public
trust" has been adversely affected.
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c.	 Water project contract rights are held by
local districts or by state and federal
project builders. Their existence softens
the SWRCB's regulatory impact, since their
effect is to substitute project allocation
policies for state water rights restric-
tions. In addition, the state and federal
projects differ significantly in their
water allocation policies (these policies
will be discussed in the "Management
Institutions" section, below).
2.	 Groundwater Allocation.
a.	 GW rights in California are controlled
primarily by the courts and some local
districts; they are not integrated into the
SWRCB's surface water allocation system.
Several local basins have been adjudicated
(southern coastal region), and special GW
management districts have been enacted
(southern coastal region, Ventura County,
Sierra Valley/Long Valley), but none occur
in the SSJV. Rights to GW in the SSJV are
poorly understood due to widespread
overdraft, disincentives to enforcement,
and uncertain application of three poorly
integrated doctrines:
(i) "Correlative rights" in overlying
landowner (superior to appropriative);
(ii) Appropriative rights in "surplus" GW;
(iii) Prescriptive rights in overdrafted
basins.
b.	 Court action is avoided in the Valley due
to vast extent of the aquifer: a suit
between a small number of water users could
result in an unmanageable adjudication
which, in the users' view, could work to
everyone's detriment by reducing and
permanently regulating all pumping.
-6-
c. The factors most directly influencing Gw
use in the SSJV are the costs of pumping
and surface water. Pumping costs vary with
the depth of the well, and in their rel -
tionship to the cost of other locally
available supplies. Surface water costs
vary with the water purveyor, as discussed
below.
d. The SWRCB has some authority over GW
allocation but it is limited and highly
controversial. Most of what exists is
unexercised.
(i) The SWRCB has no direct authority over
percolatng GW; its jurisdiction is
defined in terms of surface water and
water flowing in "underground
streams."
(ii) A 1928 amendment to the California
Constitution (Art. X, S 2) limits all
water rights in the State, including
GW, to "reasonable beneficial use;"
anyone can sue to enforce, including
the SWRCB (see, e.g., Cal. Water Code
S 275).
(iii) Other possibilities (unexercisei
authority) include requiring surface
water conservation, reduced GW
pumping, or	 management plans as
conditions in surface water
appropriative permits.
(iv) The SWRCB does exercise present
authority to encourage local GW
management; for example, it approves
permits to store surface water under-
ground -- specifically designated as a
beneficial use under the California
Water Code.
3. Water quality regulation.
Water quality regulation in the SSJV is more
prominent in surface water than GW.
a.	 T- 1967 the SWRCB was given the authority
to regulate water quality through the water
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rights permitting process. It typically
exercises this authority by limiting water
rights allocations or by requiring releases
from storage reservoirs. The SWRCB alip
administers the federal National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES);
however, point sources of pollution are nst
nearly as prevalent as nonpoint sources in
the agricultural SSJV.
b. Under the California Water Code, the SWRCB
has authority to initiate GW adjudiciations
in basins experiencing an imminent threat
to GW quality. This authority is limited
and has never been exercised.
c. The SWRCB's regional water quality control
boards have the authority to prescribe well
standards, and require localities to adopt
well ordinances, to protect water quality.
This authority has been sparingly exercised
in the SSJV (one exception is the City of
Bakersfield).
d. Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency could play
a role by declaring certain areas, such as
the City of Fresno, as "sole source
acuifers." Thus far the agency has not
done so.
e. Less explicit authority under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Section 208
planning) has been exercised to a limited
extent, to achieve voluntary, local "master
agreements" directed toward integrating
water quality and water management goals.
B. The Management Institutions 
The dominant institutions in the SSJV are surface
water development and distribution agencies.
1.	 Local water districts.
a.	 Types and governance.
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(i) The dominant district types in the
SSJv are traditional agricultural
surface water suppliers (irrigation
districts, California water districts,
water storage districts).
(ii) The major distinction between the
types of districts is political
control (land-based vs. member-based
voting). The districts are not
usefully distinguished by water
management authorities or practices.
b.	 GW management authorities vary from
district to district, as does implemen-
tation (again, however, the type of
district has little to do with GW
management activity). Recharge programs
depend largely on the availability of
"cheap" surplus water; regulatory efforts
are tied to the careful arrangement of
water deliveries under contracts held by
the districts.
(i) The districts directly own and control
the water rights on four federally
developed Sierran rivers (Kings,
Kaweah, Tule, Kern); the districts
hold contracti with the state and
federal projects which draw from the
San Joaquin River and northern
California sources.
(ii) The local districts coordinate ad hoc
and more durable arrangements among
themselves.and their water suppliers,
typically voluntary, to accomplisa
surface water exchanges, conjunctive
use programs, water quality control
and other local GW management goals.
(iii) The local districts have limited,
direct GW man7c=nt a4-27.nr'_':7;
moreover, the authority that is
present generally is not exercised.
(iv) Kern County Water Agency ("KCWA") is
an exception in that it has relatively
broad GW authority (to impose pump
taxes; replenishment assessments; well
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registration; conjunctive use
programs); however, these authorities
are the subject of intense local
political resistance, and are seldom
exercised.
(v) Several districts on the Valley's
southeast side (Cawelo and Rag Gulch,
for example) had their general
enabling legislation specially amended
for GW management purposes; these
authorities have not been exercised.
	
2.	 State Water Project ("SHP") -- distinctive
policies of importance to GW management in the
SSJV.
a. High water prices which include the
variable costs of transporting water,
frustrate SWP's overdraft correction
goals.
b. "Surplus" (lower cost) water is
utilized in many district GW recharge
programs.
	
3.	 Federal Central Valley Project ("CV?") --
policies of importance to GW management.
a. Contract allocations are determined
partly by overdraft conditions.
b. Federal water is much cheaper than SW?
water. Federal contractors are thus
in a better position to participate in
local GW management programs.
III. Case Study of Groundwater Institutions and Use in the 
Fresno Area 
A. Fresno Irrigation District ("FID"): Groundwater "Fat 
Cat"
Competition for water in the SSJV strongly favors the
East Side (in particular, the Northeast region), as a
result of several factors:
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I.	 Surface water availability, cost and security.
2. Gw cost, quality and availability; aquifer
rechargeability.
3. Land use: type, size of landholdings and statils
of development.
B. Patterns of Cooperation 
Many of FID's positions and programs reflect standard
cooperative efforts which are typical of the Valley's
approach to OW management.
1. Local "Master Agreement" under Section 208 of
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment;.
2. "Leaky Acres" -- a novel experimental recharge
program.
3. SSJV Agricultural Water Committee: in this
highly political group effort, FID adopts the
standard "Valley" position.
a. First preference: relieve overdraft by
importing surface water.
b. Second preference: let overdraft proceed
and allow economic forces to dictate which
lands will go out of production.
c. "Farmer knows best": the view that
increasing regulation at the stare level
will fail to account for the subtleties of
individual district and farm requirements,
and will create inefficiences rather than
solve problems.
d. On-farm conservation is economically
unjustified.
(i) Percolation losses are not lost (SSJV
claims 96% basinwide efficiency).
(ii) Evapotranspiration losses cannot
feasibly be reduced.
C. Patterns of Conflict: FID v. Raisin City 
Where FID's interests are adversely affected, it has
developed an independent course of action.
1. The problem: a loss of recharged water to an
unincorporated area.
2. FID's solution: state-level GW management
legislation which is supported by some districts
but threatens many others.
D. Conclusions Regarding Motivating Factors at Mork 
Although FID shares many goals and interests in
common with other SSJV agricultural water users,
important factors have dictated an independent course
for the district on key issues. Principally, these
factors include variations in surface water
availability, cost and security; groundwater quality
and depth and aquifer rechargeability; and land-use
patterns. These variations give the SSJV
agricultural community a diversity which must be
recognized in statewide water policies.
IV. Implications for the Future 
A. The Anti-Valley Position
Local goals and patterns are, obviously, only part of
the story. Valley critics have radically different
priorities and perspectives; these, too, will play a
pivotal role in SSJV water policymaking.
1. The SSJV is a major cause of the State's water
imbalance.
2. Given the extensive water developments already
in place, environmental protection -- in the
North Coast and the Delta particularly -- is the
top priority, not enhanced agricultural
production.
3. The SSJV's disaggregated institutional structure
is incapable of generating a rational management
response to state and local water supply
problems.
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4.	 History will surely repeat itself: new surface
water development will not halt or reduce
overdraft, but will be used to irrigate new
lands and exacerabate overdraft.
B. Specific Points of Conflict 
1. North Coast Rivers: To develop or not to
develop? (The rivers currently have state and
federal wild and scenic river status.)
2. Sacramento/San Joaquin River Delta: How much
environmental protection is enough, and how
should the burden for salinity control be
allocated between the state and federal water
projects?
3. Agricultural water conversation: Can meaningful
amounts of water be saved by economically
feasible technologies; are inducements or
subsidies required to encourage the adoption of
such technologies?
C. Factors Likely to Affect Future Inst,.cutional 
Arrangements 
1. Los Angeles water demand -- increasing over
time; losing Colorado River water; lacking full
entitlement supplies from the SWP; embroiled in
public trust litigation over Mono Lake.
2. Water pricing policies -- federal and state
(effects of renegotiation of Bureau of
Reclamation contracts; impact of DWR's new power
contracts on economics of pumping SWP water
upstream from the Delta, into the SSJV).
3. Climate -- annual variations in precipitation
and runoff.
4. Energy prices (increasing cost3 of pumping GW
and imported surface water.)
5. National agricultural priorities and subsidies.
6. Growing federal role in GW quality and
interstate commerce (implications of SSJV as
wholly intrastate aquifer supporting nationally
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significant industry; contrast with interstate
aquifers at issue in Sporhase and El Paso cases,
and with the extensively studied Ogallala).
D. Future Adiustments 
Recent developments seem to indicate that:
1. State-imposed GW regulation is always a
possibility, but is unlikely given current
water policies and anti-regulatory
attitudes at the state and federal levels.
2. Some new water development will occur but
will yield higher-priced supplies.
Moreover, new development will be limited
in scope and impact, and will be conditioned on
some conservation/efficiency improvements.
Future schemes, therefore, will not disrupt
existing allocations and practices, as much as
they will rely on additional supplies and a
modest strenghtening of regulatory policies.
3. To the extent new water development fails
to occur, as is entirely possible under
present political and fiscal conditions, a
premium will be placed on local and
intraregional exchanges or trading of
water. Local management efforts will be
accordingly enhanced. Some marginal
farming areas may go out of production.
The resulting water allocation patterns may
resemble the market model which economists
have long sought in the water rights
area. However, numerous legal and
institutional barriers to a free-trading
system will persist. Not the least of
these barriers will be uncertainty of title
to GW in a heavily overdrafted basin, and
to surface water under federal contracts
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STATE AND FEDERAL WATER PROJECT POLICIES AFFECTING
GROUNTHATER USE IN THE SOUTHERN SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY
State Water Project	 Central Valley Project
("CVP") Policy	 ("SW")
1. Service Areas/	 (a) Southwest Side;






in lieu of pumping
(a) Northwest Side (Westlands);
East Side (includes eastern Kern
County)
(b) Acreage limita-
tion recently revised (1982
Reclamation Reform Act)
(c) Same as SW?
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(b) Prices to increase	 (b)
steeply in mid-1980s
as present DWR power
contracts expire
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3. Surplus Water
Programs
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or even fall below
currently con-
structed capacity
(b) Some uncertainty interjected due
to current contract
renegotiations, and application of
new acreage limitation rules











5. Possible Future 	 (a) Require direct
Policies Affecting	 storage of supplies
Groundwater	 or delivery only in
Management	 lieu of pumping
(a) Same as SWP
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(c) Same as SWP
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